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Automating autism: Disability, discourse, and
Artificial Intelligence
Os Keyes
Department of Human Centered Design & Engineering, University of
Washington, Seattle, United States of America
As Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems shift to interact with new domains and
populations, so does AI ethics: a relatively nascent subdiscipline that frequently
concerns itself with questions of “fairness” and “accountability.” This fairnesscentred approach has been criticized for (amongst other things) lacking the ability
to address discursive, rather than distributional, injustices. In this paper I
simultaneously validate these concerns, and work to correct the relative silence of
both conventional and critical AI ethicists around disability, by exploring the
narratives deployed by AI researchers in discussing and designing systems around
autism. Demonstrating that these narratives frequently perpetuate a dangerously
dehumanizing model of autistic people, I explore the material consequences this
might have. More importantly, I highlight the ways in which discursive harms—
particularly discursive harms around dehumanization—are not simply
inadequately handled by conventional AI ethics approaches, but actively invisible
to them. I urge AI ethicists to critically and immediately begin grappling with the
likely consequences of an approach to ethics which focuses on personhood and
agency, in a world in which many populations are treated as having neither. I
suggest that this issue requires a substantial revisiting of the underlying premises
of AI ethics, and point to some possible directions in which researchers and
practitioners might look for inspiration.

Keywords: AI ethics, autism, feminist epistemology, critical disability studies,
personhood

Conventional approaches to AI ethics frequently concern themselves with
notions of “fairness,” “accountability,” and “transparency”—notions which
have been troubled repeatedly by scholars as failing to attend to (amongst
other issues) the discursive consequences of AI systems and
development (Hoffmann, 2019). Further, AI ethics investigations of these
principles—particularly fairness—are frequently silent on questions of
disability, and the lives of disabled people, usually attending to questions
of race and gender in isolation. Beginning from Elizabeth Ellcessor’s
argument that adopting a disabilities studies framework allows us to “find
new questions” (Ellcessor, 2016, p. 4), I seek to demonstrate not only the
harms to disabled people that occur when ethical frameworks fail to
explicitly consider us, but ways in which incorporating disability into our
evaluations of AI systems reveals more general and fundamental
problems in the ethical frameworks being adopted and normalised.
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In order to demonstrate this, I use this paper to inquire into the discursive
frameworks perpetuated by AI developers’ work, and the consequences of
these frameworks, in the case of AI research around autism. Depending
on who one asks, autism can be conceptualised in many different ways.
Under a “medical” model of disability, which treats diagnostic criterion as
representing the core truths of autistic minds and lives, autistic people
(autists) are individuals suffering from a disorder, one characterized by
stunted or absent social skills and emotional awareness. In contrast,
figures aligned with the “neurodiversity” movement seek to portray autism
and autists in a more positive light (Dyck & Russell, 2020). Floating
between these two points are an array of other perspectives that seek to
contextualise and historicise the construction of “autism” as a concept and
the already-political nature of diagnostic procedures (Eyal, 2010; Timimi et
al, 2019), trace the (often racialized and gendered) variations in autistic
experiences of the world (Brown, Ashkenazy & Onaiwu, 2017), and
articulate and critique the violence that both positive and negative
stereotypes of autistic lives and minds produce (McGuire, 2016).
Discourses surrounding autism are a particularly apt site of inquiry into AI
ethics’ consideration of disability, for two reasons. First; a large body of
work has demonstrated the particular power and relevance of popular
conceptions of autism to autistic lives. Narratives of autism—largely
authored by non-autistic family members, academics and other selfappointed experts—play an outsize role in defining the shape of autism as
a concept, and the conventional approach that society takes in evaluating,
interpreting and governing autistic lives and futures; as Ann McGuire
writes, drawing on Ian Hacking, “contemporary stories of autism
are…functioning to constitute what autism is and can be” (McGuire, 2016,
p.11).
Second; these narratives—drawing on the medical model, and
consequently the idea of autists as asocial and overly rational—resonate
strongly with ideas of algorithms, automation and machinery. As
demonstrated by Jordynn Jack, M. Remi Yergeau and other rhetoricians,
there is a longstanding symbolic link between autists and machines. This
not only takes the form of representations of autists as “computer
geeks”—of, as Maji Nadesan puts it, “the idea that people with autism are
technologically gifted and are particularly adept with computer technology”
(Nadesan, 2013, p. 4)—but through representing autists as computers; as
robotic, machine-like “others” (Waltz, 2008). Indeed, even academic
scholarship and popular media inquiries into technology frequently deploy
these popular frames of autism as a way of conceptualizing technical
systems; Pinchevski and Peters describe purported “elective affinities
between autism and new media” (Pinchevski & Peters, 2015), while a
recent Forbes editorial is bold enough to parallel autistic people and selfdriving cars (Razdan, 2020).
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My inquiry focuses on discourses of autism in two AI spaces; researchers
working on algorithms to automatically identify and diagnose autism, and
the company Daivergent, which employs autistic people in labelling
machine learning data. Through a critical analysis of papers, press
releases and media coverage, I conclude that in both cases autists are
portrayed as asocial, fundamentally lacking in the ability to know and
understand, and consequently, lacking in agency and personhood.
Perpetuating and reinforcing these discourses has profound material
consequences for autistic people inside and outside the spaces impacted
by these technologies and the organisations developing and deploying
them. More widely, however, the examination of disability and
disempowerment highlights limitations in conventional AI ethics—
limitations which go far further than “fairness” and include transparency,
accountability and other principles which demand harmed populations be
in communication with developers, even as AI systems and researchers
actively undermine the legitimacy of some communicators. This calls not
just for an avoidance of discourses which treat autistic people as inhuman,
but a wider revisitation of the premise of communication and capacity that
AI ethics is often dependent on.

Background
Conventional views of AI ethics
With the increasing development and deployment of Artificial Intelligence
(AI), attention has turned to the question of “AI ethics:” the articulation of
various approaches to the appropriate and “good” use of AI. It is important
to avoid treating this as entirely novel: within the field of surveillance
studies, for example, scholars have been investigating the rise of
automated, algorithmic decision-making for decades (Gandy, 1993; Lyon,
1994; Norris & Armstrong, 1999). But the urgency of it—the widespread
feeling that AI is “a significant emerging and future-shaping technological
field that is developing at an accelerating rate” (Goode, 2018), and a
corresponding rise in public, governmental, scholarly and corporate
interest—has led to a particular flourishing of both applied and theoretical
scholarship. The result has been myriad sets of principles, guidelines and
policies around “good” AI, what it constitutes, and what is necessary to
produce it (Whittlestone et al., 2019; Jobin et al., 2019).
As would be expected, the rapidly expanding nature of the field and the
wide range of stakeholders means that these principles are yet to
“stabilize:” theorists and practitioners frequently disagree over precisely
what constitutes an ethical approach. But some components appear fairly
consistently and frequently—in particular, notions of fairness,
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accountability, and transparency (Stark & Hoffmann, 2019; Hagendorff,
2019; Floridi et al., 2018). Although each of these principles have been
conceptualized and articulated in many different ways, (van Nuenen et al,
2020; Wieringa, 2020), a broad-strokes summary would be that fairness
requires an avoidance of discrimination in making algorithmic decisions,
transparency the disclosure of the rationale behind any such decision, and
accountability a mechanism of addressing any harmful consequences or
algorithmic failures.
Fairness has been a particularly frequent topic of discussion. Approaching
fairness as a technical problem—does a system produce uneven
outcomes for different demographic groups?—both academic and industry
researchers have begun focusing on technical tools to identify and correct
discriminatory systems, seeking to fix one algorithm with another (Bellamy
et al., 2019; Spiecher et al., 2018). Interdisciplinary researchers have
similarly attended to fairness, treating questions of bias as a primary
component of an algorithmic system’s moral valence (Buolamwini &
Gebru, 2018; Chouldechova, 2017).

AI meets Disability
Although there is value in much of this scholarship, there are two gaps in it
that are—for my work—particularly relevant. The first is in how fairness
specifically (and ethical duties in general) are discussed; while gender and
race are frequently deployed as protected characteristics to be scrutinized
in evaluating algorithmic systems, disability is not. Instead, it is often left
(at best) unmarked. Although a small number of works that substantively
discuss the ways that algorithmic systems could discriminate against
disabled people, a 2019 review of 1,659 AI ethics article abstracts found
eleven containing disability-related keywords (Lillywhite & Wolbring,
2019). This is particularly concerning given the increasing interest in
explicitly applying algorithmic systems to questions of disability.
There are signs this is beginning to change. A call by Meredith Ringel
Morris on “AI and Accessibility” (Morris, 2019), in parallel with a dedicated
workshop at the ACM SIGACCESS Conference on Computers and
Accessibility (ASSETS) 2019 (Trewin, 2018), provided a rare centring of
disability in discussions of AI ethics. Taken in concert with the World
Institute on Disability’s statement on AI (World Institute on Disability,
2019), and a report by AI Now directly addressing disability as a vital area
of consideration (Whittaker et al., 2019), we can see an increasing (and
much-needed) attentiveness to disability from AI ethicists. As would be
expected, given the already-discussed trend towards fairness as a general
value in AI ethics, this attentiveness frequently centres notions of bias and
discrimination as their core concern. The ASSETS workshop, for example,
was specifically titled “AI Fairness for People with Disabilities;” the World
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Institute on Disability’s statement repeatedly evoked questions of dataset
bias and disproportionate outcomes as their primary concern.
The problem, however, is that this framing of ethics is anything but
uncontested, as suggested by a paper at that workshop specifically
contesting it (Bennett & Keyes, 2019). There are frequent critiques raised
about fairness as a sole or primary ethical value for artificial intelligence,
both generous and pointed. Some researchers are concerned by the
immediacy of fairness: the way that fairness-based approaches to ethics
typically evaluate the immediate outputs of an algorithm, while leaving the
longer-term consequences unexamined (Selbst et al., 2019). Others point
to the manifold definitions of fairness, and the vastly different material
outcomes produced by each one (Hutchinson & Mitchell, 2019). Less
optimistically, some critics highlight the treatment of “fairness” as a value
that can, at least theoretically, be modelled, as anything but an accident.
Instead they contend that the focus on computable ethical principles that
do not address more structural and longitudinal outcomes is precisely the
point, constituting “ethics-washing” that allows organisations to continue
with “business as usual” (Wagner, 2018; Sloane, 2019).

Discrimination and Discourse
One particular issue—the second of the two gaps mentioned above—is
the question of discursive, rather than directly material harms. As
Hoffmann notes in her work on “Where Fairness Fails” (Hoffmann, 2019),
a fairness-oriented frame, with its focus on materiality, “fails to
appropriately attend to the legitimising, discursive or dignitary dimensions
of data...algorithms do not merely shape distributive outcomes, but they
are also intimately bound up in the production of particular kinds of
meaning, reinforcing certain discursive frames over others” (Hoffmann,
2019, p.908). In other words, what algorithms do is not just a question of
material goods and (direct) material harms, but a question of the
discourses and narratives they depend on, perpetuate and legitimise. A
large body of work has looked at the discourses surrounding artificial
intelligence and AI ethics; Hoffmann’s paper, along with the work of Peña
Gangadharan & Niklas, Dencik et al. and several others (Peña
Gangadharan & Niklas, 2019; Dencik et al., 2018) asks us to look at the
consequences of those discourses.
By “discourse,” critical scholarship does not mean something as simple as
statements, or rhetoric: rather, it means how statements fit into
knowledge; how they shape and signify what can be known, through what
methods, and through what actors (McHoul & Grace, 2015). To illustrate,
we can examine Bivens & Hoque’s “Programming sex, gender and
sexuality” (Bivens & Hoque, 2018), which Hoffmann highlights as an
example of critical discourse analyses in technological domains. Bivens &
Hoque investigate the discourses deployed in and around “Bumble,” a
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dating app billed as embodying feminist values. Exploring public relations
statements by the company that designs it and its figureheads, media
coverage and aspects of the app’s design, the researchers articulate how
the “feminist” figure the app is designed for is specifically a middle-class,
white, cisgender and heterosexual woman, with sometimes-dangerous
consequences (including the possibility of assault) for those who fall
outside that mold.
Bivens & Hoque’s point is not just that the app is exclusionary to a vast
range of people, but that this exclusion generates meaning: within the
world of Bumble, to be feminist is to be a white, cisgender and
heterosexual woman; to be male is to be a threat; to be a lesbian is to be
non-existent. These frames, and the way that they resonate with wider
cultural narratives, delegitimises particular populations. Bumble is not
simply an app but a tool for meaning-making and knowledge generation—
one that cannot, as designed, be positively applied to those outside a
narrow norm.
Similarly, both the technologies and cultural imaginaries entangled with
“AI” serve as a source of meaning and knowledge. As a consequence, we
should attend not just to whether particular populations are excluded, or
not, but the terms under which that happens: the justifications used, the
framings they are subject to, and how this might reinforce or undermine
damaging cultural frames regardless of what “the software” is intended to
do. If applications of AI ethics to disability do not (or cannot) investigate
this, then the model of ethics we are using may allow vast harms to go
unnoticed by those with the structural power to address them. Autism is a
particularly pertinent case study given that—as discussed earlier—it is
strongly subject to and shaped by cultural narratives and assumptions. AI
interventions around it, and any ethical silence on discursive harms, thus
involve pressing on an already-skewed scale.

AI Interventions in Autism
To demonstrate the importance of inquiring into discursive framings within
AI, and the harm such framings can cause, I undertake a critical discourse
analysis of AI research publications and popular coverage that concern
themselves with autism as a phenomenon, and autistic lives as a site of
utility or intervention. This analysis concerns itself with how “dominant
discourses (indirectly) influence…socially shared knowledge, attitudes and
ideologies…[and] facilitate the formation of specific social representations”
(van Dijk, 1993, pp. 258–9). In the case of autism, I centre questions of
what social representations of autism (and autists) are (re)produced in the
corpus, and whose voices are included or excluded from the process of
shaping those representations. Such an approach has been undertaken in
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other research on disability and technology, including Julie Elman’s work
on wearable technologies (Elman, 2018) and Spiel et al.’s inquiries into
the experiences of autistic children using co-designed technologies (Spiel
et al., 2017).

Sites of Analysis
The analysis focuses on two different projects—more accurately, one
project, and one research subfield—both of which concern themselves
with autism as a phenomenon, and autistic lives as a site of utility or
intervention. My particular sites of inquiry—sites where autism and AI take
form together—are (respectively) Artificial Intelligence for Autism
Diagnosis (or AIAD) and Daivergent.
AI for Autism Diagnostics (AIAD) originates in the perception that current
autism diagnostics are “expensive, subjective and time-consuming” (Jiang
& Zao, 2017). By replacing existing mechanisms (which are centered on
conversations between doctors and patients, and/or their friends and
family), researchers hope to provide “efficient objective measures that can
help in diagnosing this disease [sic] as early as possible with less
effort” (Thapaliya et al., 2018).
Such replacements come in a range of different forms. Many papers use
computer vision—machine learning systems that “see”—but this is
sometimes to examine behavioural or social responses (Hashemi et al.,
2018), sometimes to specifically evaluate eyeball movement (Jiang & Zao,
2017), or similarly, gait (Hasan et al., 2018), head movement (Bovery et
al., 2019), or general upper-body form (Wedyan & Al-Jumaily, 2016).
Outside of computer vision-based approaches, researchers have also
looked at the analysis of conversational or voice recordings for auditory
cues (Santos et al., 2013), the administration of screeners through a
mobile app (featuring a predictive model that interprets the data) (Omar et
al., 2019), or tracking the participant’s attempts to assess emotions while
observing videos (Uluyagmur-Ozturk et al., 2016). Many of the
methodological approaches also involve a robotic component, with robots
serving as the “unbiased” administrators or recorders of audio, video or
written tests (Prescan et al., 2018; Petric et al., 2017).
To analyse work in AIAD, I constructed a corpus of 82 papers that
investigated the use of machine learning systems for autism diagnosis.
Drawing influence from Waidzunas & Epstein’s investigation of the history
of the plethysmograph (Waidzunas & Epstein, 2015), I followed the
citation networks of papers that featured the terms (“autism” OR “autistic”)
AND “machine learning,” incorporating into the corpus any papers that
both cited a work in the initial “seed” dataset, and concerned themselves
with autism diagnostic or screening tools. In and of themselves, these are
narrow keywords; one might ask whether incorporating (for example)
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“artificial intelligence,” “neural network” or more precise machine learning
terminology would produce different results for the initial seed papers. The
answer is undoubtedly yes, but the reliance on citational networks rather
than keywords alone goes some way towards mitigating this limitation.
The resulting corpus is, while not comprehensive, fairly cohesive, with
papers regularly citing not simply one other work within the corpus but
many.
Daivergent (the name of which plays on AI and the idea of autistic people
as deviant or other) originates with a very different perceived problem: the
question of autistic people’s unemployment. The company was founded
by two data scientists, Bryon Dai and Rahul Mahida, both of whom have
autistic relatives—a brother and a cousin, respectively—and funded by the
venture capitalist Brian Jacobs, whose son is autistic (Galer, 2019; Levy,
2019). Concerned about their relatives’ future after child-oriented disability
services stopped being applicable, Dai and Mahida began Daivergent in
2017 to provide a bridge between autistic people and the technology
industry.1
This bridge consists of, in parallel, offering autistic people jobs in
classifying and “hand-coding” the input data for AI, and training in
workplace norms and practices. To the founders, pairing autistic people
with hand-coding takes advantage of what they see as the nature of
autism: a “unique aptitude” for “intensively focused, complex, repetitive
processes” (Galer, 2019). While most people get bored of such work,
autists are seen as individuals who “can do it for the day, can do it for the
week, can do it month after month” (Kadet, 2019). In exchange, they
receive salaries of $15-20 an hour, and the opportunity to “gain a
meaningful life” (Kung, 2019), with the founders pointing to ex-employees
who have gone on to work as a clerk, in a payroll role, or “even in other
places such as game design” (Galer, 2019).
Daivergent is hardly the only company seeking to market itself as
rendering autists “productive” in the technology sector—other examples
include Auticon, which describes itself as “[providing] a neurodiverse and
agile workforce to improve our client’s IT projects” (Auticon, 2020), and
Aspiritech, “a world-class QA testing company that empowers individuals
on the autism spectrum to fulfill their potential through meaningful
employment combined with social opportunity” (Aspiritech, 2020). But
Daivergent is (so far as I can determine) singular in positioning autists as
a specialised workforce within Artificial Intelligence; as unique assets in
developing AI systems and the datasets they depend on. Interestingly,
and in juxtaposition with (or perhaps reflecting?) the needs around
1

The issue of the employment and segmentation of disabled people has been widely
problematized and historicised; see (for example) Parker, Owen & Gould, 2012; Friedner,
2015; and Simon, 1994
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automated diagnostic systems, Daivergent’s registration process does not
require medical documentation—although they are silent on their
expectations, it seems likely that self-diagnosed autists make up some
percentage of their users.
Corpus contributions pertaining to Daivergent consisted of all media and
marketing coverage of the company—both traditional venues (such as
The Wall Street Journal) and non-traditional (the marketing blog of
Amazon, whose software Daivergent uses)—that could be discovered
through LexisNexis, along with the contents of Daivergent’s website and
marketing materials. This corpus spanned approximately two years, from
the founding of the company in December 2017 until December 2019.
On the surface, these are very different: academic researchers versus a
private company, AI usage versus AI design, attempts to label autism
versus attempts to label with autism. But that is precisely the point: they
are highly distinct environments, meaning that the strong alignment
between the narrative representations of autism they deploy demonstrates
that these representations are likely to appear far more frequently in AI
than in these two cases alone. Similarly, while there are obvious
differences in the types of source documents (publications versus news
coverage), both constitute the most available material in which the actors
represent themselves to their community and to the wider world. While
they have different audiences, they are ultimately the same kinds of
audience within the worlds that AI researchers and startup founders,
respectively, occupy.

Analysing Discourses of Autism
After obtaining the source texts, I analysed and coded them following an
approach based on Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), which (as
discussed above) focuses on the replication of dominant discursive
frames, and the ways in which those frames constrain individuals and
communities subject to them. In this case, my approach is one of
“sociodiagnostic critique:” I seek not simply to analyse the texts for internal
contradictions, but to situate them in the context of wider discourses and
society, and my own background knowledge (Reisgl & Wodak, 2005).
To a certain degree, CDA is methodologically agnostic; there are few
consistent approaches in how data should be collected and analysed
(Meyer, 2001). My approach consisted of collecting the source texts, and
then generating a set of themes through an inductive coding of the texts—
looking particularly at how these texts described or discussed autistic
people or autism, and how autistic people were positioned in relation to
the works.
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This approach generated a range of common themes. This included (1)
framings of autism in a highly medicalized fashion—as something
embodied, and something wrong, worth addressing and correcting—(2)
framings of autism as an epidemic, and a concern of particular urgency,
(3) positioning both AIAD and Daivergent as attempts to intervene in and
normalise autistic existences (4) a strong neoliberal motivation behind
those interventions, with the importance of addressing autism framed in
terms of financial productivity, and (5) a general lack of explicit inquiry into
race and gender, accompanied by implicit framings of autism as a
fundamentally white and male phenomenon.
Each of these themes are important and deserving of investigation.
Investigating all of them in a single paper, however, would produce rather
shallow analyses. I highlight them here largely for methodological
transparency, and to surface them as areas of future research for other
scholarly works (and/or scholars). Instead, I would like to focus in depth on
one particular theme that arose—the theme of autistic communication,
and of knowledge. How do AIAD and Daivergent materials construct the
ability of autists to know, and to communicate that knowledge?

Autism Discourses in AI
The terms “to communicate” or “to know” have a range of possible
meanings and interactions. My understanding and use of those terms in
this paper draw from feminist philosophers of knowledge, specifically the
work of feminist epistemologists who (from the 1970s onwards) have
consistently attended to questions of knowledge and communication. This
consists not just of examining what constitutes knowledge, but “attention
to what kind of subject one must be in order to be (seen as) a knowing
subject” (Tuana, 2017, p. 126); attending to who can know. Under this
frame (and many other approaches to questions of knowledge),2
knowledge and communication are deeply bound up in each other.
Knowledge must be communicated, recognised, and treated as credible in
how it is evaluated (McConkey, 2004).
The social and reciprocal nature of knowledge and its construction is wellestablished in Science and Technology Studies; as Helen Longino
summarises, “scientific inquiry is a collaborative human activity [and is]
socially organized in certain ways that affect both goals and criteria of
success” (Longino, 1990, p. 17). This is neatly demonstrated in the work
of historian Ann Johnson, whose explorations of the social circumstances
of engineering design processes treat technology as the result of sociallyWittgenstein, for example, noted that “knowledge is in the end based on
acknowledgement” (Wittgenstein, 1969), and it is difficult to place him within feminist
epistemology due to (amongst other things) his renowned misogyny.
2
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mediated knowledge, and (in some respects) as an instantiation of such
knowledge (Johnson, 2005; Johnson, 2009). But this relationship between
knowledge and social recognition is not just a matter of professionalized
research, or an abstract, theoretical concern; knowledge-making is deeply
important to day-to-day activities and individuals’ status in society. As
Genevive Lloyd notes in her foundational work on feminist epistemology,
in a society that conceives of itself around notions of rationality, the ability
to know (and be seen to know) is deeply tied up with one’s
humanity (Lloyd, 2002). Put simply, someone who is not a recognisable
knower is not a person, and vice versa. Both the ability to communicate
and the ability to know thus have deep implications for personhood
(Congdon, 2018).
Scholarship on epistemic personhood has frequently identified disability a
factor in its extension—so, too, race and gender. Given this, and the long
history of how race, gender and disability are interwoven in both discursive
and material structures of oppression (Samuels, 2014), my analysis aims
to consider not only the positioning of autists writ large but the role that
gender and race play in the narratives of autism on display, and the
consequences of those narratives.

Communication and Knowledge of Others
Questions of sociality are deeply implicated in both societal framings of
autism, and framings of knowledge—and so it is no surprise to see it
appear in the ideas of autism deployed by AI researchers and developers.
By sociality I mean the ability to appropriately and properly interact with
others—something that has implications around both communication and
knowledge. An absence of sociality is “often deemed to be a major feature
of those diagnosed as being on the autism spectrum” (Milton, 2012): it is a
core component of narratives within research (Verhoeff, 2012), current
and defunct diagnostic criteria (O’Reilly et al., 2019), and public
perception (Billawala & Wolbring, 2014). When it comes to
communication, autists are sometimes framed as literally lacking the
ability to communicate with others—many of us are nonverbal. For those
of us who are verbal, our particular tropes are treated as inappropriate or
invalid. These include echolalia (repeating the words of another), which is
seen as containing no value (Roberts, 1989), and overly direct styles of
communication, frequently treated as rude or disruptive. Verbal and nonverbal autists often engage in stimming—repetitive motions to ground
one’s sensory presence in an environment—which is often seen as
disruptive to the status quo and a deviation from appropriate
communication (Nolan & McBride, 2015).
There are alternative interpretations of each of these: stimming as a
coping mechanism (Kapp et al., 2019), sociality as being constitutable in
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autistic ways (Heasman & Gillespie, 2019), echolalia as a form of
communication (de Jaegher, 2013)—but that is not the point. Autistic
modes of communication are treated as less-valid, and less intelligible.
Moreover, the explanation for unconventional communication is often one
of knowledge: rather than simply being ignorant, autistic people are seen
as not being able to understand what is appropriate communication, and
incapable of understanding others.
In both AIAD literature and the materials released to frame Daivergent, we
see the same stereotypes and tropes replicated. Both diagnostic AI
researchers and Daivergent figureheads are unified in pointing to
abnormal social behaviour and communication as an autistic attribute:
“serious shortcomings in their social skills” (Irani et al., 2018). More
specifically, “deficiency” in making eye contact (Uluyagmur-Ozturk et al.,
2016), “serious problems with being creative” (Lund, 2009), “difficulties” in
recognising the emotions of others, and “delay or perversion in
language” (Altay & Ulas, 2018). It “makes ordinary social interactions
particularly challenging” (Levy, 2019), explaining the high unemployment
rate: as one set of researchers mournfully inform us, “about 50% of people
with autism can never ... make useful speech” (Altay & Ulas, 2019).
Unsurprisingly, then, the interventions themselves build on and replicate
these assumptions. In the case of AIAD, one way of framing the computer
vision-oriented diagnostic tools—intended to replace, again, subjective
interviewing—is to understand it as dependent on the presumption that
diagnosis cannot rely on purposeful autistic communication. In the case of
Daivergent, we see a repeated emphasis on the fact that the company
provides not only jobs, but social skills opportunities: it emphasizes that
“Daivergent stands out for the training it provides…not just technical skills
but social and communication skills-training” (Prafder, 2019), and offers
employees the ability to “Join any of our 15 shared interest groups to meet
like-minded individuals that share your passions” (Daivergent, 2019a).
Positioning itself as a provider of “unique social and communication
training opportunities...alongside shared interest groups that help connect
the autism community to one another,” Daivergent operates from the
implicit assumption that autistic community—of which there is much,
including organisations serving/led by non-verbal autistic people (Yergeau,
2018)—does not exist; that autistic communication must be guided and
shaped to be legitimate or capable of being recognised and
understood (Daivergent, 2019b; Demo, 2017).

Knowledge of Self
So if autism is defined by a lack of communicative competence, and a lack
of understanding others—where does that come from, and what are the
implications? The dominant explanation within popular and academic
ideas of autism is Baron-Cohen’s model of “Theory of Mind:” the idea that
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autistic people simply lack empathy and an understanding of
others (Dinishak, 2016).3 From this comes the associations autism has
with a lack of empathy, bluntness, and difficulties communicating.
But there are other implications that stem from this as well; implications
about autistic knowledge of self. “Empathy,” in much theory and
philosophy, is not something that just appears de novo: it is something
learned, and premised on our own experiences. The analogy of a
“simulation” is used; we model our idea of others on our own senses of
self, and simulate how we would interpret the situation were we in “their
shoes.” A consequence of this is that normative theories of autistic minds
do not just imply a lack of understanding of others, but that this stems from
a lack of understanding of self. Jeanette Kennett, for example, uses “the
highest-functioning autistic people” as an intellectual foil, positioning them
as “[having) some capacity for introspection about their condition”
(emphasis mine) and thus implying that the default state for autists is total
ignorance of self (Kennett, 2002). Autists are framed as unreliable
narrators of their internal state, incapable of knowing and representing
their needs or desires, much less communicating them. Indeed, as noted
by M. Remi Yergeau,4 “clinical constructions of autism frequently position
expertise and self-knowledge as antithetical to autism itself” (Yergeau,
2018, p.140).
In the absence of such knowledge, autistic people cannot be credible
sources of information—not even information about ourselves. With
Daivergent, it is notable that (with one exception, discussed later) no
autistic people speak in their materials, press coverage, interviews or
marketing reports. Instead, the idea of autism and the needs of autists are
communicated by non-autistic people, pointing to the existence of autistic
family members as a source of their expertise. Dai, for example, is
depicted as having “first-hand experience with the challenge” by dint of
having a brother who directly experiences autism (Galer, 2019), while
Mahida states that “We both [have) family members with autism. We know
the type of things they enjoy doing,” generalising those “things” to autists
as a whole, and speaking for autists as a population when he states
emphatically that “They want to work in tech. They want to work doing
things for AI” (Kung, 2019).
Within the diagnostic AI research, the bulk of users and perspectives
center familial voices rather than autistic ones. In Thabtah’s study, the app
was designed for use by “a variety of stakeholders including parents,
3

Simon Baron-Cohen is, interestingly, the cousin of Sacha Baron Cohen. The two could
not be more different; one creates deeply bigoted and distressingly popular media
content that describes and normalises the worst excesses of society’s violence towards
marginalized persons. The other wrote Borat.
4 From whose book, Authoring autism, the title of this paper is lovingly purloined.
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caregivers and more importantly health professionals”, but never selfdiagnosis (Thabtah, 2019); Irani et al.’s project adapted to feedback
solicited from “the parents” (Irani et al., 2018); in Tariq et al.’s study,
participation was determined by the parents—referred to throughout as
the “participants”—despite the data covering autistic people up to the age
of 17 (Tariq et al., 2018). Under the discourse of autism used, autistic
people cannot consent or give feedback, not simply because they cannot
communicate but because they have nothing to communicate.

Knowledge, Agency and Personhood
If autists are entities lacking in the ability to communicate and be social,
and further, lacking the ability to have knowledge of self (much less
knowledge of others): do autists have agency? Personhood? Are autists,
really, human?
I raise this question because the answer that dominant frames of autism
provide is “no.” Indirect inhumanity is communicated through
representations of autists as alien (Reddington & Price, 2016),
robotic (Belek, 2017), or (in much of ethics, and in “autism advocacy”)
analogous to psychopathy: an interesting thought experiment in whether
one can be a moral agent while quite so neurologically deviant (McGeer,
2008; Krahn & Fenton, 2009; Saunders, 2018). More directly, autism is
treated as oppositional to the traits that “make” a person a person (Duffy &
Dorner, 2011). Yergeau, while critiquing such ideas, summarises them
with the statement that “humans are human because they possess a
theory of mind, and autistics are inhuman because they do not” (Yergeau,
2013).
Portrayals of inhumanity in AIAD research and Daivergent’s materials are
largely indirect. But one telling illustration of the wider industry context and
approaches comes from media coverage of the company, discussing
broader efforts to employ autistic people and other people with “intellectual
disabilities” (IDD):
“At Salesforce.com, a customer relationship management (CRM) software
company headquartered in San Francisco, 46 IDD workers are currently core to
the firm’s operations, says Benny Ebert-Zavos, manager of real estate
communications for the organization. ‘We hire them to organize and maintain
conference rooms, assist with event setup, support our reusable dish program,
stock pantries, upkeep our social lounges, stock office supplies and brew coffee,’
he says. ‘These folks are the key to making sure that when people come in, they
can focus on work.’” (Prafder, 2019)

Notable is the distinction between “these folks” and people; the distinction
between their labour and “work.”
Similarly, we can see instances of how the treatment of autists as
inhuman correspondingly portray autists as “divorced from concepts of
https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/sociotechnicalcritique/vol1/iss1/8
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agency and autonomy” (Quirici, 2015). This is hardly surprising:
Korsgaard, in reviewing the nature of agency, describes conventional
conceptions of agency as consisting of the ideas “that the capacity for
agency consists in or depends on the existence of certain normative
relations, and that the realization of that capacity—success in action—
depends on conformity to the norms in question” (Korsgaard, 2014). In the
case of autists, we can see the construction of autistic relating as
abnormal, and of autists as incapable of adhering to normative relations,
as precluding the possibility of autistic agency—at least, absent
confirmation from normative actors.
These ideas of autists as non-agentic feature heavily, albeit indirectly, in
Daivergent’s literature—as a positive. Consider the rationales provided for
hiring autistic people in particular; their dedication to engaging in the same
tasks “month after month” (Kadet, 2019), a status that resonates more
strongly with metaphors of machines than of people. But that is not all:
companies should hire autistic people because they have “perseverance”
and a “sense of loyalty;” because they are not going to leave (Levy, 2019).
To be autistic, after all, is to neither know what you want nor how to
communicate it, and so the concept of autonomous autists is as alien to a
normative view of autism as autists allegedly are to themselves.
Non-agentism and inhumanity also feature, albeit more implicitly, in much
of the AIAD literature. As well as discussing communication, the literature
also discusses violence and risk. An autistic person has “a very high risk
for wandering; he can become very dangerous for himself, his family and
the society as he can harm others as well as himself in an
aggression” (Omar et al., 2019). Autism impacts “self-control and [the]
person’s ability to learn” (Pahwa et al., 2016). Stimming and other
“stereotypical motor movements can lead to self-injurious behaviour under
certain environmental conditions” (Albinali et al., 2009). In all of these
framings, autists appear as figures who are—as a consequence of this
dearth of outer awareness and communication—fundamentally lacking;
lacking control over self, lacking the ability to engage in inference, lacking,
in other words, in agency and the ability to choose. An autist is not a
person—an autist is a machine, one whose misfiring outputs betray faults
in their wiring.

Discussion
In my analysis above, I examined the discursive framing of autistic
communication and self that is deployed by Artificial Intelligence for
Autism Diagnosis (AIAD) research, and the autist-employing startup
“Daivergent.” In doing so I suggested that in both cases, work follows a
normative approach in describing autists as lacking in communication,
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sociality and sense of others—and further, lacking in sense of self. This
approach results in turn in a perception of autists as unpersons; as
inhuman, and as lacking in agency and autonomy. Below, I discuss the
material and conceptual implications of AI research perpetuating and
internalising this logic.

The consequences of conventional frames
Discourses are an important part of the “output” of sociotechnical systems
and narratives—and a part inextricably wound up in how those discourses
help shape the structure of society. Simply because something is
discursive does not mean it does not have material consequences. So
what are the implications of AI development perpetuating this conventional
framing of autism? What consequences does this have for autistic people?
Answering this requires us to take a step back and look at the existing
consequences of these narratives. If we look at how autists are already
treated in other sites, as a result of the conventional framing of autism, we
see some profound and disturbing phenomena. Some of it is interactional,
and day to day: the treatment of autistic sociality and communication as
invalid and less-than creates heightened feelings of stigma and “negative
difference and feeling lesser,” leading to the “exhausting” work of hiding
one’s otherness, simulating normativity, for the fear of ostracisation should
one be detected (Hodge et al., 2019).
Other material consequences of conventional framings—and of their
reinforcement—are far more tangible, and far more clearly violent. As a
result of autistic communication being seen as an oxymoron, approaches
to repairing communication failures between autists and non-autists are
ones of normalisation: “fixing” autistic people, rather than attempting to
meet autistic people in the middle. Such “repair” is frequently violent,
featuring—in the case of Applied Behavioural Analysis (ABA), the
standard “treatment” for autists—training centered on “aversives:”
responding to autists stimming, communicating non-normatively or “acting
out” through withdrawing access to food, social interaction or touch.
Children may be subject to aversives “in the forms of time-outs (often in
closets, cells or segregated rooms), Tabasco sauce on one’s tongue,
spray bottles filled with vinegar, forced proximity to a cold or hot surface,
physical restraint, screams directed at the child, and so on”—all for
something as simple as refusing to touch one’s nose (Yergeau, 2018,
p.97). The most extreme form of this (or the logical conclusion of it,
depending on one’s level of cynicism) can be seen in the form of the
Judge Rothenberg Center, located in Massachusetts, which uses
“aversives” such as straightjacketing, electrocution to the point of thirddegree burns, and the inhalation of ammonia (Adams & Erevelles, 2017).
An immediate reaction to this is one of horror; what monstrosity! What
inhumanity! But “inhumanity” is the point; of course these are the
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therapies, of course the center has not been shut down: those subject to
these tortures are not people. They cannot consent, in the sense that they
cannot say “no;” what they say, even about the treatment of their own
body, cannot be taken seriously at all. As Adams & Erevelles point out, it
is not that (in the ensuing lawsuits) autistic people did not testify as to their
experience and assaults—it is that their voices were not taken as
communicating valid knowledge compared to the (professional, welladjusted, and credible) doctors (Adams & Erevelles, 2017).
As this paper demonstrates, the attitude taken by Daivergent and AIAD
researchers neatly fits into the conventional understanding of autism.
Correspondingly, it reinforces them—in a small way, to be sure, but in a
way that is still worthy of ethical and political notice. AI does not exist
outside of the world, and so narratives within AI that further cement violent
discourses have an impact on the broader domains—employment, and
healthcare, in this case—in which autistic people are subject to this
ongoing violence.
More directly, one might ask what the construction of autism taken by
these researchers and founders means for those directly interacting with
them. What about AIAD patients, or Daivergent employees? If autists
cannot validly know, whose perspective is foregrounded in the event that
an autist disputes the outcome of a diagnostic algorithm? Whose
perspective is foregrounded in the event that an autist disputes the
morality of this algorithmic work in general? When autistic employment is
oriented around assumptions of roboticism and machinic lack of self, what
happens when autistic employees display autonomy? It is hard to imagine
an AI company that sees autists as asocial or non-agentic as taking
seriously, for example, attempts to unionise: a union of autists would be a
contradiction in terms.
The consequences of these framings are hardly evenly distributed;
although race and gender are seldom, if ever, substantively raised in the
sources (hence the lack of discussion in my findings), this is distinct from
stating that the framings are not gendered and racialized. Mainstream
conceptions of autism have always been both; as a few (but by no means
exhaustive) set of examples, I would point to the way that Baron-Cohen’s
“Theory of Mind” positions autism as constituting an “extreme male brain,”
the broadening of autism diagnoses and criterion’s origins, in part, in a
desire by white parents to differentiate their children from the
(predominantly black) people diagnosed with “childhood schizophrenia”
(Eyal et al., 2010), and the portrayal of Black autists as violent, and in
need of controlling (Erevelles, 2014). So, too, is epistemic personhood
gendered and racialized; there is a reason much of the work on
knowledge and injustice originates in feminist and Black philosophy (Mills,
2007; Ortega, 2006; Code, 2014). As a result, it would be unsurprising—
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indeed, it seems somewhat inevitable—to see the narratives of
dehumanization I highlight, and their consequences, deployed particularly
powerfully against gender and/or racial minorities.

The consequences of conventional AI ethics
Beyond the material consequences, however, these questions of
autonomy, humanity and their discursive construction raise wider
questions about the nature of AI ethics itself. They raise questions not
simply about whether AI systems can be developed in a way that is just to
autistic people, but whether AI ethics can reliably conceive of exclusionary
injustices as a problem.
Understanding what I mean by that requires that we take a step back.
When I say “AI ethics” I mean something very particular; the normative,
default set of values which (as discussed above) seem widely agreed
upon as, if not an entire system for achieving justice, then at least a good
starting point. Fairness, true, but also accountability and transparency.
These principles are fundamentally premised on a recognition of injured
parties as people, and as social creatures, and as viable knowers.
Accountability requires being answerable to people and in conversation
with them; transparency requires a relationship of shared exchange and
reasoning; fairness requires a form of recognition and acknowledgement
of a population as distinct and worthy of equality as “people.” In other
words, AI practitioners are discursively framing certain populations as nonhuman and non-agentic in parallel with ethical frameworks that depend on
humanity and agency for addressing harms.
In this case study we have seen how discourses of autists as asocial and
non-agentic produce material harms—but it seems to me we should also
ask what flaws they highlight in AI ethics frameworks for addressing those
selfsame harms. If autistic people are being constructed by AI
practitioners as incapable of agency and full humanity, in an ethical
framework that treats agency and full humanity as mutual dependencies of
each other, and both as a necessary prerequisite for participating in the
frameworks to address injustices, then we have an impasse. If our
approach to ethics is simultaneously (1) framed around notions of
communication, credibility and recognition and (2) framing autistic people
as lacking in those things, there is no viable way for autists to participate
in processes that are frequently treated as the panacea to any injustice
this domain generates. Autists will be subject to both discursive and
material violence, and the discursive violence will strip us of the ability to
viably dispute either.
Now, one immediate solution to this might appear to be to move the
goalposts—to declare that discursively framing autists as less-than-human
is wrong. This would certainly help, although the issue is far more
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widespread than one of discourses within AI ethics. Maintaining rigid
boundaries around who counts as a person, and as a knower, is nearly
ubiquitous in normative philosophy more generally. Liberal philosophy
often treats people as “fully rational, mutually-independent
decisionmakers” (Schwartzman, 2006); individuals who do not meet these
conditions are denied access to decision-making processes and modes of
political or ethical engagement. Such an approach is frequently criticised,
for the same reasons that I raise concerns with AI ethics. In particular,
feminist philosophers and philosophers of disability have taken issue with
the way that the idea of rationality and independent agency as a basis for
personhood risks silencing, harming and literally dehumanising those who
(for whatever reason) cannot make a claim to such status. Moreover,
because the resulting ethical frameworks assume such status, they are
frequently “strangely silent about the predicaments of outsiders” (O’Neill,
2000, p. 4)—as Lauren Davy notes in reviewing the work of John Rawls,
disability is “relegated ... to a footnote ... a problem to be worked out later
when all other matters of justice are settled” (Davy, 2019, p. 105).
Critiques of these approaches, and the uneven distribution of what counts
as rationality and interdependence, provide a set of ideas to ameliorate
the harms that result—ideas that we may be able to use in AI ethics. The
work of José Medina and Miranda Fricker, in particular, highlights the
need for us to engage in work that includes not only openness and selfcriticality in how we interpret people and perspectives on an individual
basis, but the construction of forms of “hermeneutical resistance:” ways of
knowing and communicating that actively push back against monolithic
ideas of personhood and knowledge (Medina, 2013; Medina, 2017;
Fricker, 2007). In the case of AI ethics, this might look like actively pushing
back against proposals for monolithic conceptions of justice, or
mechanisms for achieving it, while developing more polyphonic and
adaptive approaches.
More broadly, we might consider different ways of conceptualizing
personhood altogether. A feminist “care ethics” approach to personhood
and knowledge that treats not just disabled people but all people as
dependent on communities, infrastructure and relationships: that treats
personhood as relational and wrapped up in our relationships of care to
each other (Davy, 2019). To go further we might examine the
“posthumanist ethics” of Karen Barad and others, which (as adroitly
explained by Natasha Mauthner) “seeks to conceptualize ontological,
epistemological, and ethical agency without recourse to the human
subject” (Mauthner, 2019, pp. 680–681). Paying critical attention to how
we conceptualise personhood and knowledge, and what we make those
concepts depend on (and dependents of) would not simply allow for more
disability-aware approaches to AI ethics, but additionally address
concerns around race, gender and sexuality; Medina’s scholarship,
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discussed above, is rooted in part in the recognition that knowledge—and
humanity—are additionally (some would say, fundamentally) racialised
and gendered.
Still, I am cautious and cognizant that these suggestions are ultimately
efforts to ameliorate dehumanization in the structure of mechanisms for
correcting injustice. As demonstrated by the work of agonistic theorists in
political philosophy, there is no singular approach that will “solve” the
question of otherness and silencing (Honig, 2016; Mouffe, 2000).
Regardless of where we draw the line with regards to personhood,
knowledge and access to justice, we are drawing a line—marking some as
legitimate and some as not. Pragmatically, my intention with this paper is
to highlight a substantial loophole in conventional framings of AI ethics—
the loophole of personhood—and the need to address it. I do not believe
we can escape silencing and perpetuating injustices altogether. But what
we can do is confront it in how we theorise about justice, and mechanisms
to achieve it. We can understand harm as an inescapable consequence of
efforts to reduce it, and understand those efforts as ultimately contingent,
and open to challenge. Most broadly, then, my demand is not simply for a
consideration of discursive harm, and disabled voices, in the development
of AI ethics, but a more wide-ranging demand that we avoid the fatal
mistake of treating any mechanism, or set of principles, as settled.

Conclusion
I have analysed the approach that both public and private-sector entities
seeking to “help” autistic people with Artificial Intelligence take to defining
and framing autism, and autists. Doing so has revealed that these entities,
their research and their public materials push a vision of autists as asocial,
unknowing and somewhat non-human creatures, lacking in agency and
autonomy.
This validates concerns that AI ethics is failing to attend to the
consequences of AI discourses, and failing to attend to disability. But it
also raises tensions and issues with the very premise of conventional AI
ethics, which is often dependent on practices of communication and
recognition, and so (tacitly) requires the treatment of individuals as
“people” before their concerns can be heard. If autistic communication is
invalid—if autists are invalid—and resolving harms is a communicative
practice conducted between valid people, then harms to autistic people
simply cannot be resolved under such a frame.
One approach would be to make sure that we simply treat autistic people
as people—but keeping a dependency on and bar to personhood still
leaves some individuals dehumanised and unable to access our
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frameworks for addressing harms, even if those individuals are not
autistic. Instead, I advocate that critical attention be paid not only to the
immediate barriers to accessing justice, but the status we give to
“personhood” in the first place. This includes, as discussed, a greater
attentiveness to the conditions under which we evaluate knowledge and
communication, and efforts to reshape our idea of the ethical agent (and
so victim of unethical behaviour) to be relational, rather than hyperindividualised. I encourage researchers and practitioners concerned about
disability justice specifically, or weaknesses in our ethical frameworks
more generally, to consider these possibilities.
My intention here is not to demand some particular universal ethic to
replace the current one; I am unsure whether any universal approach can
resolve these issues, rather than replicate them in new forms. Instead, my
goal is simply to encourage an urgent recognition of how violence toooften depends on our willingness to treat the terms of “humanity” and
“personhood” uncritically, and accept them as a prerequisite for ethical
attention. To this end, I want to underscore how vital it is that we retain
and reinforce that critical lens—that we avoid treating any term of art or
scheme of justice as unquestionable and “settled law.” Who can play the
game is a vital question, but so, too, is whether the dice are loaded.
Working towards justice requires us to continually ask the second, as well
as the first.
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